2 to deduce that the partition was a result of defensive concerns.
The apparent spectre of a territory largely devoid of natural resources and with negligible European commercial interests encouraged incisive historians such as Langer 1 and later Robinson et al. The imperial annexation of this vast territory, which includes modern Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, has been heralded as the definitive example of late-Victorian grand strategy. This article re-examines the sequence of, and motives for, the partition of eastern Africa. Finally, building on this, it will be argued that the role of Britain's anti-slave-trade policy needs to be fully acknowledged, with regard to Britain's raison d'être for establishing a formal presence on the mainland in 1885 with the occupation of the territories encompassing modern Kenya and Uganda in successive stages from 1885 to 1895. The second and third sections will expose the importance of public opinion in formulating a forward policy in the region. The article will first expose the importance of the prelude to partition in determining its ultimate geographical scope, in particular Anglo-German relations, local treaties and the commercial expectations for the lakes region. Second, using a wide range of sources, a new chronology of events will be proposed that divides the annexation process into three separate stages. It first outlines the existing historiography, namely the dominant geo-strategic Nile model, and suggests that there are two major areas of weakness upon close analysis: a lack of documentary evidence the way the sequence of actual events and policy decisions is inconsistent with the main thesis.
This article re-examines the partition of East Africa.
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